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ABSTRACT
This paper proposes a new method to measure ethnolinguistic diversity and offers new results linking
such diversity with a range of political economy outcomes -- civil conflict, redistribution, economic
growth and the provision of public goods. We use linguistic trees, describing the genealogical relationship
between the entire set of 6,912 world languages, to compute measures of fractionalization and polarization
at different levels of linguistic aggregation. By doing so, we let the data inform us on which linguistic
cleavages are most relevant, rather than making ad hoc choices of linguistic classifications. We find
drastically different effects of linguistic diversity at different levels of aggregation: deep cleavages,
originating thousands of years ago, lead to measures of diversity that are better predictors of civil conflict
and redistribution than those that account for more recent and superficial divisions. The opposite pattern
holds when it comes to the impact of linguistic diversity on growth and public goods provision, where
finer distinctions between languages matter.
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1 Introduction
How does ethnolinguistic diversity affect political and economic outcomes? In recent years, a
vast literature has argued that such cultural heterogeneity impacts a wide range of outcomes,
fostering civil war, undermining growth, hindering redistribution and the provision of public goods.
However, evidence on this point remains subject to some disagreement. For instance, there is a
vibrant debate on the role of ethnolinguistic divisions as determinants of civil wars.1 Econometric
results on growth, redistribution and public goods provision also vary widely across studies, raising
issues of robustness.2
These inconclusive results may stem in part from the inability to convincingly define the eth-
nolinguistic groups used as primitives to construct measures of heterogeneity. When faced with
the issue of how to define groups, researchers have either relied on readily available classifications,
such as the ones based on the Atlas Narodov Mira or the Encyclopedia Britannica, or have carefully
constructed their own classifications.3 Both approaches are problematic: the former runs the risk
of missing the relevant cleavages, whereas the latter is subject to the criticism that groups are
defined based on how important they are expected to be for the problem at hand. In this paper,
we propose a methodology that addresses both criticisms, and argue that the degree of coarseness
of ethnolinguistic classifications has profound implications for inference on the role of diversity.
The methodology we propose computes diversity measures at different levels of aggregation.
We do so by exploiting the information of language trees. We refer to this as a phylogenetic
approach, since tree diagrams describe the family structure of world languages. Depending on
how finely or coarsely groups are defined, the measure of ethnolinguistic diversity will be different.
For example, if one takes the different dialects of Italian to constitute different groups, then Italy
appears to be very diverse. However, if one considers these different dialects to be only minor
variations of Italian, then Italy looks homogeneous. Apart from allowing us to classify languages at
1Fearon and Laitin (2003) show that ethnic fractionalization is not an important determinant of the onset of civil
wars. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), in contrast, argue that ethnic polarization is a significant determinant of
the incidence of civil conflict.
2Alesina et al. (2003) argue that while ethnic and linguistic fractionalization are usually negatively related to
growth and the quality of government, the significance of these partial correlations is sensitive to the specification.
3For an excellent discussion of the difficulties raised by the issue of defining relevant or salient ethnolinguistic
groups, see Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), section 5.2.1, page 792.
1
different levels of aggregation, this approach has the advantage of giving a historical dimension to
our analysis. Coarse linguistic divisions, obtained at high levels of aggregation, describe cleavages
that go back thousands of years. In contrast, finer divisions, obtained at low levels of aggregation,
are the result of more recent cleavages. Since we rely on data that cover the entire set of 6, 912
world languages, and examine effects of heterogeneity measures computed at all possible levels of
aggregation, we are able to capture a wide range of linguistic classifications. Rather than choosing
the "correct" classification ourselves, we let the data inform us as to which linguistic cleavages are
most relevant for different outcomes of interest.4
Our empirical analysis reveals drastically different effects of linguistic heterogeneity at different
levels of aggregation. We also find that the relevant cleavages differ greatly across political economy
outcomes. Starting from the data, specifications and estimation methods from major contributions
to the literature on the political economy of ethnolinguistic diversity, we substitute our new mea-
sures of diversity for those commonly used. For civil conflict and the extent of redistribution,
issues that inherently involve conflicts of interest, coarse divisions seem to matter most. While
we find only weak evidence that diversity (whether measured by fractionalization or polarization)
affects the onset of civil wars at any level of linguistic aggregation, the estimated effects do tend to
be larger and more significant when considering a coarse classification. This finding is consistent
with existing conflicts in African countries, such as Chad and Sudan, on the border between the
Afro-Asiatic family and the Nilo-Saharan family. It may also help explain conflict in certain Latin
American countries, such as Mexico and Bolivia, where the Indo-European family coexists with
different Amerindian languages. For redistribution, the results are more robust, and suggest once
again that measures based on a high level of aggregation matter most. In contrast, for economic
growth, where coordination between individuals or groups is essential and market integration is
important, we find that finer divisions lead to heterogeneity measures that matter more. The same
pattern holds across a wide array of measures of public goods provision.
Thus, when the main issue involves conflicts of interest (as for the onset of civil wars and
4Our approach is related to existing work arguing that people identify with different groups in different contexts
(particularly the work of Crawford Young on situational identity - see Young, 1976). For instance, ethnolinguistic
cleavages that matter for voting behavior in local elections may differ from those that matter for national elections.
For a related point, see Posner’s 2005 book on ethnic politics in Zambia. More generally, cleavages that matter
for some outcomes may not matter for others. There is no such thing as a “correct” classification of languages or
ethnicities - this depends on the context.
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the extent of redistribution), deep differences originating thousands of years ago matter most:
different groups’ interests differ more when cleavages are more deeply rooted. In contrast, more
superficial and recent divisions appear sufficient to hinder growth, an outcome related to the ease of
coordination. For instance, to the extent that clusters of economic activity form around language
lines, linguistic divisions may limit the integration of markets, and prevent economic growth. Even
though Hindi and Gujarati are not so different, this linguistic cleavage may hinder the integration
of the corresponding regions of India. What matters here is whether two individuals or groups
can interact effectively. In fact, finer linguistic classifications deliver heterogeneity measures that
matter more for outcomes such as economic growth, which is hindered by lack of coordination
and integration. As for public goods, they fall somewhere inbetween both cases: although they
have a redistributive aspect, their effective provision also requires coordination between groups or
individuals. Empirically, we find that fine linguistic divisions, based on more superficial cleavages,
hinder public goods provision across a wide array of indicators.
This paper is related to a vast literature in political economy. Various authors have studied
how ethnolinguistic diversity affects redistribution, growth and civil conflict (Easterly and Levine,
1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Alesina et al., 2003; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Alesina and La Ferrara,
2005, Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999, among many others). Measurement issues are central to
recent research on these topics. One issue is that standard indices of diversity do not take into
account the distance between groups (Fearon, 2003; Desmet et al., 2009; Spolaore and Wacziarg,
2009). Another possibility is that for certain issues, such as civil conflict, polarization may be more
relevant than fractionalization (Esteban and Ray, 1994; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005), an
issue we revisit below. A third problem is the difficulty of determining the right level of aggregation
when computing heterogeneity measures, i.e., identifying the relevant ethnolinguistic cleavages.
This issue has received little attention, and it is the main focus of the present study.5
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes conceptual issues related to the mea-
surement of heterogeneity based on language trees, and describes the data. Section 3 discusses the
effects of diversity on civil conflict and redistribution. Section 4 covers the effects on public goods
5Fearon (2003) does discuss at lengths the issue of how to define the "right list" of ethnic groups serving as the
basis for computing heterogeneity measures, and recognizes explicitly that not all cleavages may be relevant for a given
outcome. However, he presents data on ethnic groups based on a single classification. Scarritt and Mozaffar (1999)
present data on ethnic groups for Sub-Saharan countries using three different classifications, but do not examine the
effects of using these different classifications on political and economic outcomes.
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provision and economic growth. Section 5 concludes.
2 Aggregation and Linguistic Diversity
2.1 A Tale of Two Countries
To illustrate our approach, we start with a comparative case study. Over the period 1965-2000,
Chad and Zambia experienced some of the lowest growth rates on the globe, their income per capita
shrinking by an average of 1 percentage point per year (Table 1). The 2005 Human Development
Index ranked Chad 170 and Zambia 165 out of a total of 177 countries. It has long been argued that
low growth may be related to high ethnolinguistic diversity. With 135 languages spoken in Chad,
and between 40 and 70 in Zambia, these countries certainly are very diverse: taking the commonly
used fractionalization index as a measure of diversity, the Ethnologue database on languages gives a
value of 0.95 for Chad and 0.85 for Zambia, putting both countries in the top decile. As highlighted
by Easterly and Levine (1997), data for a broad cross-section of countries point more formally to
a general negative relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and economic performance. In our
data, the 10% most diverse countries had an average per capita growth rate of a meager 0.54%
over the period 1960-2004, whereas the 10% least diverse countries posted a much more sturdy
figure of 2.59% (linguistic diversity here is measured using the most disaggregated classification of
languages).
In spite of their high ethnolinguistic fractionalization, in terms of conflict and civil war Chad and
Zambia have been at opposite sides of the spectrum. Chad has been at war almost continuously
since independence, whereas Zambia has not witnessed any civil conflict worth speaking of. In
Chad, during colonization, and after independence in 1960, the Christian South was privileged,
and formed the political elite, to the detriment of the Islamic and partly Arab-speaking North.
Dissatisfaction by the North led to a civil war, which started in 1965, and lasted for about a decade
and a half, culminating in the rebels taking over the capital and ending Southern dominance.
Since then the country has remained unstable, partly because of the inverted power relation, with
the North now dominating the South, but also because of power struggles within these regions. In
recent years, for example, there has been increasing ethnic tension between the Zaghawa and Tama,
two non-Arab groups. Zambia, in contrast, has had a history of peaceful coexistence between the
many groups and tribes. Although voting behavior in Zambia tends to run along language groups
(Posner, 2003), it has not led to the violence seen in countries such as Chad. Income redistribution,
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which is an issue involving divergence of interests, is often interpreted as related to conflict. Data
on redistribution confirm the contrast between both countries: figures on transfers and subsidies
as a share of GDP reveal that on average between 1985 and 1995 Chad redistributed 0.9% of GDP,
compared to 3.8% in Zambia.
This example illustrates the main point of this paper: although commonly used measures of
diversity make Chad and Zambia look very similar, those measures mask one important difference
between these countries in terms of diversity. Of the total population in Chad, one third speaks
an Afro-Asiatic languages, a little over half a Nilo-Saharan languages, and the rest a language of
the Niger-Congo family. In contrast, in Zambia, 99.5% of the population speaks a language from
the Niger-Congo family. This raises an important point: whereas Chad and Zambia are amongst
the most diverse countries on the globe, when considering language families rather than individual
languages, we obtain a very different picture. While Chad continues to be one of the most diverse
countries, ranking 7 out of 225, Zambia now looks very homogeneous, ranking 176 out of 225,
similar to Portugal. In other words, when taking every language as being different, Zambia is
very diverse, similar to Chad, whereas when aggregating into language families, Zambia no longer
appears to be quite so heterogeneous.
The experience of Chad and Zambia suggests that the type of diversity that matters for economic
growth is different from the type of diversity that matters for civil conflict and redistribution. The
essential difference between the two types of diversity is the degree of aggregation. The relevant
degree of aggregation, and thus the relevant definition of a group, depends on the problem at hand.
This case study suggests that, for economic growth, fine differences between languages may matter,
whereas for civil conflict and redistribution, only coarse differences may play a role - as is confirmed
below in large samples.6
6The difference in the experience of Chad and Zambia with conflict and redistribution is not related to the use of
measures of linguistic fractionalization rather than polarization, but to the issue of aggregation. As Table 1 reveals,
using a standard measure of polarization instead of fractionalization leads to the same conclusion: the difference in
polarization between Zambia and Chad is much more pronounced for highly aggregated linguistic classifications than
for disaggregated ones. Correspondingly, conflict and war has been continuous in Chad, but absent in Zambia. We
discuss the important issue of how the distinction between polarization and fractionalization (which has to do with
the functional form used to calculate measures of diversity) relates to the level aggregation (which has to do with the
definition of relevant groups) in Section 2.3.
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2.2 Language Trees and Linguistic Diversity
2.2.1 The Construction of Language Trees
This paper seeks to measure linguistic diversity at different levels of aggregation. To do so, we use
language trees. We refer to this as a phylogenetic approach (as the linguistics literature does), re-
ferring to the fact that tree diagrams capture the genealogy of languages, classified in terms of their
family structure.7 Using language trees gives a historical dimension to our analysis. Coarse lin-
guistic divisions, such as that between Indo-European and non Indo-European languages, describe
cleavages that originate thousands of years ago. In contrast, finer divisions, such as that between
Dutch and German, tend to be the result of more recent splits. For instance, Gray and Atkinson
(2003) estimate separation times between language groups within the Indo-European family. While
the separation between Indo-European languages and all others is estimated to have occurred prior
to 8, 700 years ago, the separation time between different dialects of Greek is estimated to have
occurred only 800 years ago. There are differences of opinion between linguists on the precise dates,
but the general point of an association between tree structure and separation times remains. We do
not require that there be a strict association between the coarseness of the linguistic classification
and the time since the linguistic split between groups occurred - we only point out that coarse
classifications capture cleavages that tend to go back deeper in the past.
Linguistic differentiation occurs because specific human populations become relatively isolated
from each other and, as a result, develop specific languages over time. In general three major factors
can affect the degree to which languages differ. The first factor is the time since the populations
speaking these languages have split from each other. As noted, populations speaking French and
Spanish have split from each other much more recently than populations speaking, say, Swahili
7This point was recognized going at least as far back as Charles Darwin, who wrote: "If we possessed a perfect
pedigree of the mankind, a genealogical arrangement of the races of man would afford the best classification of the
various languages now spoken throughout the world; and if all extinct languages, and all intermediate and slowly
changing dialects, were to be included, such an arrangement would be the only possible one. Yet it might be that
some ancient language had altered very little and had given rise to few new languages, whilst others had altered
much owing to the spreading, isolation, and state of civilization of the several co-descended races, and had thus given
rise to many new dialects and languages. The various degrees of difference between the languages of the same stock,
would have to be expressed by groups subordinate to groups; but the proper or even the only possible arrangement
would still be genealogical; and this would be strictly natural, as it would connect together all languages, extinct and
recent, by the closest affinities, and would give the filiation and origin of each tongue." (Darwin, 1902, p. 380).
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and Tibetan. The second factor, known by linguists as Sprachbund (or language union), results
from interactions between populations that are already linguistically distinct (Emeneau and Anwar,
1980). For example, historically the spread of Latin words likely had a homogenizing influence on
European languages, keeping Romance and Germanic languages more similar than would have been
the case without commercial and political interactions. The third factor is the size of the population.
Linguistic drift tends to be faster in smaller populations. For instance, Lithgow (1973) studies the
Muyuw language, spoken on Woodlark Island (New Guinea): 13% of the Muyuw vocabulary was
replaced in a period of 50 years during the middle of the 20th Century (see also Dixon, 1997,
for a discussion). This language is spoken by only 6, 000 individuals, according to Ethnologue.
Empirically, this determinant of linguistic differentiation does not greatly affect our measures of
diversity, as it only affects very small linguistic groups.
Linguistic trees such as those from Ethnologue, which we use in our empirical analysis, are
constructed by linguists to capture the first factor.8 That is, Spanish is a closer cousin of French
than Swahili is of Tibetan. Higher levels of aggregation describe deeper ethnolinguistic cleavages,
while differences between languages that are noticeable at lower levels of aggregation only reflect
more superficial cleavages. The degree of linguistic diversity considered at these different levels of
aggregation differs, and this is the variation we exploit in our empirical work.
We emphasize that the issue of aggregation is separate from (although related to) the issue
of how to capture the distance separating languages when computing measures of diversity (for a
paper that accomplishes the latter goal, see Desmet et al., 2009; for indices of fractionalization that
take into account distances, see Greenberg, 1956 and Bossert, D’Ambrosio and La Ferrara, 2009).
We are after identifying the level of aggregation that corresponds to the most relevant cleavages
for the various dependent variables we examine. A focus on the level of aggregation that captures
the relevant cleavages retains a strong focus on ethnolinguistic groups as the basis for individuals’
identification with, or alienation from, a given ethnolinguistic identity or group (we borrow the
identification/alienation terminology from Esteban and Ray, 1994). In contrast, distance-weighted
measures of diversity (such as the measure proposed by Greenberg, 1956), capture the expected
8There are controversies among linguists on the right classification of languages. For example, Greenberg (1987)
considers that all Native American languages can be classified into three groups (Eskimo-Aleut, Na-Dene, Amerindian)
whereas the Ethnologue contemplates dozens of unrelated families. However, the classification provided in the Ethno-
logue is the most widely used and, to the best of our knowledge, the only one available in electronic format covering
all of the languages of the world.
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distance between individuals, and relegates the group structure to the background. Our approach is
therefore distinct from approaches that make use of distances between groups: we are interested in
identifying the group structures (or classifications) that matter most for political economy outcomes.
At the same time, by construction, more aggregated classifications retain groups that tend to me
more distant from each other (in terms, say, of separation times, or in terms of how different the
languages are), compared to more disaggregated classifications.
To illustrate the discussion above, Figure 1 displays the tree for the major languages in Pakistan.
On the left side of the figure, we list the level of aggregation. At level 7, the most disaggregated
level, there are seven main languages: Panjabi, Pashto, Sindhi, Seraiki, Urdu, Balochi, and Brahui.
Going up the tree, the number of groups declines, as the level of aggregation rises. For instance, at
level 4, there are only 5 linguistic groups - at that level, Panjabi, Seraiki and Sindhi are classified as
one and the same. At level 3, only linguistic groups are left (Iranian, Indo-Aryan and Dravidian).
Finally, at aggregation level one, there are two groups: Dravidian (Brahui) and Indo-European (all
others). These classifications allow us to compute measures of diversity at each level of aggregation.
2.2.2 Measuring Diversity at Different Levels of Aggregation
How precisely are the measures of diversity computed? A typical tree is represented in Figure 2.
The root of the tree is represented by the upper-case letter O, whereas the leafs of the tree are
represented by lower-case letters a through g. In Figure 2, all leafs have a common root, so that the
tree is rooted (this terminology is borrowed from the field of linguistics). As can be seen, the tree
has three different levels. Each of the seven leafs at level 2 represent a living language. The three
nodes at level 1 represent the (extinguished) mother languages of the existing languages. The node
at level 0 represents the common ancestor language of the three mother languages. The number
below each living language at level 2 indicates the assumed shares of the population speaking the
corresponding language. The numbers below the (extinguished) mother languages at level 1 are
the aggregated population shares of their corresponding daughter languages.
To compute diversity at different levels, we require that the tree be rooted, and that the number
of branches (or edges) between any leaf and the root be identical. In this subsection, we focus on the
widely used index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (or ELF), the probability that two randomly
picked individuals belong to different groups (in our empirical work we also consider measures
of polarization). The diversity measure at a given level of aggregation is the ELF index for the
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linguistic groups as they appear at that level. For example, diversity at level 2 is given by the ELF
index, taking the seven living languages as the relevant groups. Thus, ELF (2) = 1− 3× (0.22)−
4× (0.12) = 0.84. To calculate diversity at level 1, the seven living languages are aggregated into
3 distinct groups A, B and C, resulting in an ELF index ELF (1) = 1− 0.42 − 2× (0.12) = 0.66.
One difficulty remains. The linguistic trees from Ethnologue are all rooted trees, but the number
of branches varies among linguistic families and subfamilies. Figure 3 represents a typical language
tree from Ethnologue. As can be seen, language A has more descendent generations than languages
B or C. As before, the leafs of the tree represent the existing languages. They are denoted by the
letters a11, a12, a21, a22, a31, a32, b1, b2 and c. It is clear that for this type of tree we cannot use
the method applied in Figure 2, because at level 3 we would be ignoring 3 of the 7 languages. The
branches in the trees need to be extended, and there are two main ways to do this, as displayed in
the two panels of Figure 3. This ensures that all the existing languages are represented as leafs at
the lowest level of aggregation.
The first approach, displayed in Panel I of Figure 4, assumes that all living languages are
equally distant from the root, where the distance between languages is defined by the number of
branches or nodes separating them (in technical terms, this assumes that the tree is ultrametric).
Take, for example, language C. We insert two fictitious languages, c1 and c11, at levels 1 and 2,
so that the total number of branches between C and O is the same as for all other leafs. The
second approach, displayed in Panel II of Figure 4, assumes that C is only one branch removed
from the root O. In this case, Figure 4 shows that to have all living languages at the same level,
we move C down to level 3, but assume that its mother, grandmother and great-grandmother have
all remained the same as the origin language O. In our empirical work, we use measures based
on the first approach, as it seems natural to assume that languages went through intermediate
states between their origin languages and their current form. We also think it unlikely that origin
languages remained unchanged until a recent date. However, for the sake of robustness we also
computed and used measures based on the second approach, and using either approach did not
make much difference for our results (estimates are available upon request).
Completing the tree under either approach, we can apply the method used in the example of
Figure 2 to compute the degree of diversity at the different levels of the tree. Notice that at the
lowest level (level 3) both approaches yield the same degree of diversity since the different groups
are just the existing languages. It is easy to see, however, that the two approaches in general do
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not yield the same degree of diversity at other levels of the tree.
2.3 Measures of Diversity and Summary Statistics
We consider two sets of commonly-used measures of diversity: fractionalization and polarization.
For i(j) = 1....N(j) groups of size si(j), where j = 1...J denotes the level of aggregation at which
the group shares are considered, fractionalization is just the probability that two individuals chosen
at random, will belong to different groups:
ELF (j) = 1−
N(j)X
i(j)=1
£
si(j)
¤2
This measure is maximized when each individual belongs to a different group. Polarization, in
contrast, is maximized when there are two groups of equal size. We use the polarization measure
from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). This index satisfies the conditions for a desirable index
of polarization in the axiomatic approach of Esteban and Ray (1994):
POL(j) = 4
N(j)X
i(j)=1
£
si(j)
¤2 £
1− si(j)
¤
We compute these measures at each of the 15 levels of aggregation available in the linguistic
classification in the 15th edition of Ethnologue, the source for our linguistic data (Ethnologue,
2005). The sample contains 226 observations which include countries and their dependencies (due
to data availability, our regression results are based on a smaller set of countries). To simplify
the presentation, we focus on only 5 levels of aggregation (those are levels 1, 3, 6, 10 and 15,
with higher numbers denoting a lower degree of aggregation). All our empirical results are also
available at the intermediate levels. Table 2 presents summary statistics for the diversity measures
at these 5 levels of aggregation, and Appendix 1 contains the corresponding data series by country.
To facilitate the quantitative assessment of the regression results, Panel A displays means and
standard deviations. When measured using the ELF index, the average degree of diversity rises
as the level of aggregation falls, as expected. When measured using a polarization index, diversity
falls at high levels of aggregation, and plateaus as aggregation falls further.
Interesting information can also be gleaned from Panel B of Table 2, displaying correlations.9
First, changing the level of aggregation greatly affects the measures of diversity: the correlation
9We also investigated the pairwise correlations between our measures of diversity and measures commonly used
in the literature. These correlations are maximized when using our most disaggregated measure. For instance, the
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between ELF (1) and ELF (15) is only 0.526. Second, the correlation between polarization and
fractionalization, at the same levels of aggregation, rises as the level of aggregation increases (the
correlation between POL(15) andELF (15) is only 0.555, while the correlation between ELF (1) and
POL(1) is 0.988). This is intuitive as, when aggregating, fewer groups remain, and the distinction
between polarization and fractionalization fades. Third, aggregating up is not the same as switching
from a measure of fractionalization to a measure of polarization: the correlation between ELF (1)
and POL(15) is only 0.391. This last observation indicates that the issue of aggregation is very
different from the choice of functional form to compute diversity measures. In our empirical work,
we show that switching from fractionalization to polarization measures has relatively benign effects
on the substantive results, while changing the level of aggregation to compute either measure
delivers vastly different estimates of the effect of diversity on political economy outcome.
Finally, Figures 5 and 6 display the full distributions of ELF (1), ELF (15), POL(1) and
POL(15). As can be seen, at high levels of aggregation the distributions of both fractionaliza-
tion (ELF (1)) and polarization (POL(1)) have a strong positive skew. This makes sense: when
classifying languages to be different only when they pertain to entirely different families, most
countries display low levels of diversity, and only a few exhibit high diversity. In contrast, at low
levels of aggregation the distributions of fractionalization (ELF (15)) and polarization (POL(15))
are much more uniform. That is, many of the countries that were not diverse when only looking
at language families are now much more diverse. This is the example of Zambia mentioned above:
it is highly diverse if each of the 46 languages are taken to be different, and it is not very diverse
when one considers that only 2 out of the 46 languages do not belong to the Niger-Congo family.
correlation of ELF (15) with ethnic fractionalization from the Atlas Narodov Mira is 0.82, with the Alesina et al. (2003)
measure of ethnic fractionalization, it is 0.67, with the Alesina et al. (2003) measure of linguistic fractionalization,
it is 0.84, and with the Fearon (2003) measure of linguistic fractionalization, it is 0.75. These correlations fall to the
0.35 − 0.4 range when using ELF (1), the measure based on the most aggregated linguistic classification. Turning
to religious fractionalization, the correlation between ELF(15) and religious fractionalization from the Alesina et al.
(2003) dataset is 0.195, and at the level of ELF(1) this correlation drops to 0.098.
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3 Linguistic Diversity, Civil Conflict and Redistribution
3.1 Civil Conflict
There is an ongoing academic debate on the relationship between ethnolinguistic diversity and the
onset of civil conflict. In a seminal paper, Fearon and Laitin (2003) argued that once measures of
income per capita are controlled for, measures of ethnic and religious fractionalization are unrelated
to the onset of civil conflict. We reexamine this issue using the baseline specification in Fearon
and Laitin’s study (column 1 of their Table 1, page 84). Using exactly their data, their estimation
method and their dependent variable (the onset of civil conflict), we simply substitute our measures
of linguistic heterogeneity for their measure of ethnic fractionalization. Results are presented in
Table 3 (for fractionalization) and Table 4 (for polarization).10
The first and most important observation is that the effect of fractionalization and the corre-
sponding level of statistical significance both fall dramatically and monotonically when the level of
aggregation falls. At level 1 (the most aggregated level), linguistic fractionalization has a coefficient
of 1.06 with a t-statistic of 2.02, and the coefficient falls to −0.051 with a t-statistic of 0.14 at level
15. This pattern is robust to using polarization instead of fractionalization. The second observation
is that the coefficient on linguistic diversity is only positive and significant when considering the
most aggregated classification of languages - whether for polarization or for fractionalization. The
coefficient remains significant at least at the 10% level for most of the robustness tests we conducted
- but since the level of significance sometimes falls below 5% we want to be cautious in claiming
that there exists a robust relationship even at this level of aggregation. A conservative reading
of our results suggests that, to the extent there is a statistically significant link between diversity
and civil conflict, it only appears when the relevant cleavages are the deepest (aggregation level
1). In terms of economic magnitude, the estimated effects are far from trivial at aggregation level
1. When evaluating marginal effects at the mean of all the independent variables, a one standard
deviation change in linguistic fractionalization (0.173) is associated with an increase in the prob-
ability of conflict equal to roughly 11% of this variable’s mean (the mean probability of civil war
onset is 1.725% in the sample). This effect quickly fades to zero as the level of aggregation falls,
as displayed graphically in Figure 7. The standardized magnitude is the same for polarization at
aggregation level 1, and fades to zero even faster.
10The tables presents results at selected levels of aggregation, namely levels 1, 3, 6, 10 and 15 (results for all other
levels are available upon request, but do not add much to the picture).
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The pattern of coefficients across levels of aggregation is robust to a wide range of modifica-
tions of the baseline specification: 1) adding continent-level dummy variables, 2) substituting a
dichotomous measure of democracy for the continuous one, 3) controlling for intermediate levels
of democracy (anocracy), 4) redefining civil wars to only include “ethnic” civil wars (as defined in
Fearon in Laitin, 2003), 5) using the Correlates of War definition of civil wars instead of Fearon
and Laitin’s, 6) controlling for GDP growth and lagged growth and 7) using the incidence of con-
flict rather than the onset, as Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) did in their study. All these
robustness tests are available upon request.
As shown in Figures 5 and 6, most countries in the world appear very homogeneous at level
1. Countries that do feature such cleavages tend to coincide with the geographic breakpoints of
major linguistic groups, such as in Chad. Our results indicate that ethnolinguistic divisions of this
nature may matter for civil conflict, but that more superficial divisions do not. Since there are few
countries that feature high levels of diversity at the very aggregated level of linguistic families, civil
conflict affected by this type of cleavage must be relatively rare.
Where does this leave us in the debate about the role of ethnolinguistic diversity as a determinant
of civil wars? On the one hand, for all but one level of aggregation, ethnic diversity does not matter.
As was recognized in the past literature, this does not imply that civil conflicts do not often have
an ethnic dimension - conditional on having a civil conflict, it may very well be waged along
ethnic or linguistic lines (for instance ethnolinguistic differences may help identify combatants, as
in the famous Biblical example of the shibboleth). This is compatible with a finding that linguistic
diversity does not affect the probability of conflict onset. On the other hand, we did find that the
significance and magnitude of diversity rises as the level of aggregation increases. To the extent
that civil conflict is caused by the "us" versus "them" divide, this result helps clarify that "us" and
"them" need to be separated by deep historical and cultural cleavages for these divides to have any
claim of affecting the onset of civil conflict.
3.2 Redistribution
A vast literature examines the role of ethnic and linguistic differences as a determinant of the extent
of income redistribution. At the microeconomic level, several authors have examined the propensity
to redistribute. For instance, Luttmer and Fong (2009) find in an experimental setting that people
donate more money to Hurricane Katrina victims when the victims are perceived to be of the same
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race as the donor. In another study, Luttmer (2001) reports that "individuals increase their support
for welfare spending as the share of local recipients from their own racial group rises", using data
from the United States, also suggesting a preference channel. These results are in line with those
of Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001), as well as Alesina and Glaeser (2004), arguing that the
U.S. redistributes less than Europe in part because of its greater degree of racial heterogeneity.
At the cross-country level, results are more mixed. While the preponderance of evidence points
to a negative association between ethnolinguistic fractionalization and redistribution, this finding
is not always robust to the use of alternative measures of diversity and to the inclusion of controls.
For instance, in Alesina et al. (2003), the effect of ethnolinguistic fractionalization on the share of
transfers and subsidies to GDP appears sensitive, in terms of statistical significance, to the inclusion
of several control variables. This study measures fractionalization using a rather disaggregated
classification of ethnic and linguistic groups. In a broad cross-country sample, Desmet et al. (2009)
find that linguistic diversity, measured to account for the distance between groups, is negatively
associated with redistribution, measured by the share of transfers and subsidies in GDP. However,
this result does not hold when measures of diversity do not account for the degree of linguistic
distance between groups, suggesting that the depth of linguistic cleavages matters. In a wide
variety of settings, ethnolinguistic diversity seems associated with lower redistribution, but what
cleavages are more or less relevant to account for these findings has not been determined.
We use exactly the specification and data in Desmet et al. (2009) to examine what level
of linguistic aggregation matters for redistribution, i.e. what are the relevant cleavages. The
dependent variable is the average share of transfers and subsidies in GDP between 1985 and 1995.
The specification is the one that involves the broadest set of control variables - including GDP
per capita, country size, the percentage of the population over 65, legal origins and a variety of
geographic variables (Table 2, column 8 in Desmet et al., 2009). Tables 5 and 6 present the results
for, respectively, fractionalization and polarization. The results for both measures are similar,
and reveal a striking pattern: linguistic diversity negatively affects redistribution at high levels of
aggregation, but the effect declines in magnitude as the level of aggregation falls, and ceases to be
statistically significant at the 5% after aggregation level 5. Figure 8 displays this pattern, plotting
the standardized beta on fractionalization (i.e. the effect of a one standard deviation increase in
fractionalization as a fraction of a one standard deviation change in the dependent variable) against
the level of aggregation. The effect of ELF (1) is substantial in magnitude, as it equals −8.7% and
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is significant at the 5% level. It falls to −4.2% for ELF (6) and ceases to be statistically significant.
These results are robust to considering alternative sets of controls, as in Desmet et al. (2009), with
the caveat that with a sufficiently restricted set of control variables, the effect of linguistic diversity
remains statistically significant even at low levels of aggregation.
To summarize, we find that for redistribution, as for conflict, the relevant cleavages are those
that capture deep ethnolinguistic splits, rather than divisions that are more recent and superficial.
Commentators often point out that solidarity does not travel well across groups. We find that
solidarity travels without trouble across groups that are separated by shallow gullies, but not
across those separated by deep canyons. This is consistent with aforementioned studies arguing
that racial animosity has negative effects on redistribution in the U.S., as those studies focus almost
exclusively on the arguably deep cleavage between blacks and whites.
4 Linguistic Diversity, Public Goods and Growth
4.1 Public Goods
The effect of ethnolinguistic diversity on the provision of public goods raises interesting conceptual
issues. On the one hand, public goods entail a dimension of redistribution, and differences in
preferences may hinder their provision. In this sense, there is an element of conflict of interest
when it comes to public goods. On the other hand, free rider problems and coordination failures
need to be overcome for the effective provision of public goods. Linguistic diversity may work to
affect public goods through both channels.
Several studies have explored the relationship between public goods provision and ethnolin-
guistic diversity, both across and within countries. In their important study of the cross-national
determinants of the quality of government, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999,
henceforth LLSV) showed that ethnolinguistic fractionalization, measured by an average of five
existing indices of fractionalization, generally had a negative impact on several measures of public
goods, such as literacy rates, infant mortality, school attainment and infrastructure. Alesina et
al. (2003) broadly confirmed these results using new data on ethnic, linguistic and religious frac-
tionalization and polarization, although the results were somewhat sensitive to the chosen measure
of diversity and specification. In a within country context, Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999)
showed that across cities, metropolitan areas and urban counties of the United States, greater
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ethnic diversity was associated with lower provision of education, roads and sewers.
In a more microeconomic context, Habyarimana et al. (2007) report that in a variety of games,
co-ethnic participants from a sample of slum dwellers in Kampala, Uganda, play cooperative strate-
gies more so than players from different ethnic groups. This is consistent with findings in Miguel
and Gugerty (2005), suggesting that public goods provision is lower in more ethnically diverse lo-
cations in Kenya. Other studies include Vigdor (2004) who shows that higher racial, generational
and socioeconomic heterogeneity across US counties is associated with lower response rates to the
2000 Census questionnaire, and Banerjee et al. (2005) who, in the context of rural India, find that
higher caste and religious fragmentation is associated with lower provision of a wide range of public
goods. Although these results are compelling, it is not clear what ethnolinguistic cleavages are
most relevant as determinants of public goods provision.
To analyze empirically the effects of diversity computed at different levels of aggregation on the
provision of public goods, we start with the econometric specification and data in LLSV (1999).
To minimize the potential for omitted variables bias, we focus on the specification that include the
largest set of control variables — including legal origins, GNP per capita, latitude, and religion shares
variables (this corresponds to the specification of their Table 6, pp. 256-260). Instead of focusing
on a broad set of measures of the quality of government as they did, we focus on the category of
dependent variables they label "output of public goods". This includes log infant mortality, log of
school attainment, the illiteracy rate, and an index of infrastructure quality.
The results are presented in the top panels of Table 7 (for fractionalization) and Table 8 (for
polarization). For three of the four dependent variables, the statistical significance of the coefficient
on ELF rises as the level of linguistic aggregation falls. The effects are of the expected signs,
namely linguistic fractionalization is negatively associated with school attainment, but positively
associated with log infant mortality and the illiteracy rate. There is no significant association with
the index of infrastructure quality at any level of aggregation (this was also the case in LLSV). The
LLSV measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization is most highly correlated with ELF (15) - the
correlation between the two measures is 0.835, and falls steadily as the level of aggregation rises.
Correspondingly, in quantitative terms the magnitude of our estimates is very close to LLSV’s when
ELF is measured at aggregation level 15. Finally, comparing Tables 7 and Table 8, we see that
linguistic fractionalization is a much better predictor of public goods than linguistic polarization,
as no clear patten emerges when using the latter set of measures.
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In order to investigate whether these results hold up to using a broader set of indicators of pub-
lic goods provision, the bottom panels of Tables 7 and 8 consider 6 additional dependent variables,
taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2008). These includes measures of
health care (hospital beds per person, measles immunization rates for children), measures of access
to public services (availability of sanitation services and clean water), and specific measures of
infrastructure (road and rail network density).11 The results broadly confirm the findings obtained
from the LLSV measures: 1) for measures of sanitation and clean water, the effect of fractionaliza-
tion rises in magnitude and statistical significance as the level of aggregation falls; 2) for measures
of health services, the effect of ELF remains consistently significant for the measles immunization
rate across aggregation levels, but is insignificant for hospital beds; 3) infrastructure measures are
unaffected by fractionalization whatever the level of aggregation; and 4) fractionalization is a better
predictor of public goods provision than polarization.
To summarize, across a wide range of measures of public goods, we broadly confirm results
from the literature referenced above: ethnolinguistic diversity is bad for public goods provision.
More importantly for our purposes, we also find that measures of fractionalization based on finer
classifications of linguistic groups tend to matter more than those based on deep cleavages only. In
contrast with redistribution, for which only deep splits were important, even relatively recent and
shallow linguistic cleavages are sufficient to hinder the provision of public goods.
4.2 Growth
In recent years, scholars have focused on ethnolinguistic diversity as a determinant of economic
performance. Easterly and Levine (1997) argue that ethnic diversity, measured by an index of
fractionalization, may account for much of Africa’s growth tragedy. These cross-country results
were reinforced and extended in Alesina et al. (2003). In particular, the latter paper showed that
linguistic diversity per se, not just ethnic diversity, has a significantly negative effect on per capita
income growth in a panel of countries, so that both ethnic and linguistic diversity are alternative
ways to capture a broader concept of cultural heterogeneity. In addition, the paper found that
fractionalization measures were more robust predictors of growth than polarization measures, an
11We measure the latter as a ratio of kilometers per 1,000 inhabitatnts, but the results ars unchanged when using
kilometers per square kilometer of land area instead. Results are available upon request.
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issue we revisit below.12
To examine the impact of linguistic cleavages at various levels of aggregation, we start with a
specification in Easterly and Levine (1997). We focus on the specification in their Table IV, column
1, which contains a number of control variables while at the same time allowing for a relatively
large sample of countries over the period 1960-1990. Our results are presented in Tables 9 and 10,
for fractionalization and polarization, respectively. The estimator is random effects applied to a
panel of decade averages.13 Table 9 reveals that the effect of fractionalization increases in absolute
value when the level of aggregation declines - this is true in terms of the estimated coefficient, and
also true in terms of the standardized beta displayed in Figure 9. ELF starts to become statistically
significant at the 95% confidence level at aggregation level 9, and remains significant thereafter.
In terms of magnitudes, Figure 9 indicates that the magnitudes settle, after level 9, at about
18% - namely a typical deviation in fractionalization can account for 18% of a typical variation in
growth. No clear pattern emerges when it comes to polarization, which comes out negative but
not statistically significant at acceptable levels of confidence (Table 10): consistent with findings
in Alesina et al. (2003), linguistic polarization appears largely unrelated to economic growth, and
measures of fractionalization are more robust predictors of growth. Finally, these findings are robust
to considering an expanded set of control variables, as was done in Easterly and Levine (1997).
While doing so results in a smaller number of observations due to data availability issues, the basic
pattern outlined above holds, or is even reinforced, when: 1) controlling for political assassinations,
2) controlling for political assassinations plus financial depth, the black market premium, and the
12For a survey of the empirical literature on ethnolinguistic diversity and economic performance at the level of
countries, cities and villages in developing countries, see Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). This is related to a more
microeconomic approach highlighting the costs and benefits of cultural and linguistic diversity within teams or
organizations. See for instance Lazear (1999), Prat (2002) and Cremer, Garicano and Prat (2007). While at the
cross-country level the empirical results point to a negative relationship between ethnolinguistic diversity and growth,
the findings are more contrasted at the within-firm level, with some studies pointing to positive effects of diversity.
At the cross-city level in the U.S., Ottaviano and Peri (2006) also point to a positive effect of cultural diversity on
the productivity of U.S. natives.
13Hauk and Wacziarg (2009), using simulations based on the Solow model, show that random effects and SUR
produce very similar estimates. We use random effects because it is computationally much easier to produce estimates
for an unbalanced panel, and we wish to exploit as much of the available information as possible. Our results are
not materially different when using SUR on a balanced panel, despite the resulting fall in the number of available
observations. These SUR results are available upon request.
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fiscal surplus to GDP ratio, 3) controlling for all of the above plus the number of coups d’état, the
number of revolutions, a dummy for civil wars and a measure of political rights (Gastil’s index of
democracy).
In a second test, we extend the time span of our data. We also include a number of additional
control variables that have become commonly used in more recent empirical growth research: we
start from an augmented Solow model which include the investment rate, a measure of human
capital (the number of years of schooling in the adult population aged 25 and over - results do not
change when using a flow measure such as the secondary school enrollment rate), and a measure of
population growth. In addition, it includes measures of market size used in Ades and Glaeser (1999)
and Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2000), namely the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP, the
log of population, and the interaction between these two variables. Finally, the regression includes
period fixed effects, and dummy variables for Sub-Saharan Africa as well as Latin America and the
Caribbean. The timespan extends from 1960 to 2004, and the regressions include an unbalanced
panel of 101 countries. With the wider set of control variables and the longer time span, we get
results very similar to those obtained using the Easterly and Levine (1997) specification. Coefficient
estimates are shown in Tables 11 and 12. The standardized betas displayed in Figure 10 are very
similar to those in Figure 9. Again, the effect of ELF becomes greater in magnitude and more
significant when the level of aggregation falls, and the standardized beta settles around 18% at
levels 9 and higher. The level of significance is overall greater than before, with ELF becoming
significant at the 95% confidence level at aggregation level 6. As before, polarization measures
appear largely unrelated to growth.
To illustrate the quantitative importance of ethnolinguistic diversity for economic growth, we
analyze the case of the world’s two most populous countries, China and India. Both have experi-
enced high growth rate in recent decades, although India continues to lag behind its East Asian
neighbor. According to the Penn World Tables (version 6.2), over the period 1960-2004 China
averaged an annual growth rate in real GDP per capita of 5.63%, compared to 2.75% in India.
China is also much less linguistically diverse than India: at aggregation level 15, India’s ELF index
is 0.93, while China’s is 0.49. Fitting the regression model in Column 5 of Table 11 to these two
datapoints, we calculate that 25% of the growth difference between India and China over 1960-
2004 is accounted for by differences between these two countries in ELF (15). About 29% of the
difference is accounted for by differences in ELF (9), where the magnitude of the effect of linguistic
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fractionalization is maximized. Thus, taken at face value the estimates in our model can account
for a large portion of the difference in growth performance in India and China.
To summarize, these results show that to capture the relevant cleavages that affect economic
growth, focusing only on deep cleavages is not sufficient. Instead, one needs to take into account
finer distinctions across linguistic groups. This does not imply that deep cleavages do not contribute
to negatively affecting growth, as these deep cleavages do contribute to diversity at lower levels of
aggregation: fractionalization measured at low levels of aggregation is affected by both deep and
shallow cleavages. The point is that fractionalization measured at high levels of aggregation ignores
many of the shallower, yet relevant, cleavages, and therefore amounts to a noisy measure to predict
the effect of diversity on growth.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have uncovered new evidence on the relationship between ethnolinguistic diversity
and a range of political economy outcomes, such as the onset of civil wars, the extent of redistri-
bution, the provision of public goods, and economic growth. We sought to identify the relevant
linguistic cleavages to explain variation in these outcomes. We let the data tell us whether deep
cleavages, originating at an earlier time in history, are more or less important than more superfi-
cial cleavages that have arisen more recently. Doing so, we departed from the common approach
relying on arbitrary definitions of what constitutes a relevant ethnolinguistic group. Our results
carry several lessons. When it comes to civil conflict and redistribution, deeper cleavages tend to
matter more. In contrast, for economic growth and public goods, we found that diversity measured
using only deep cleavages is not sufficient to predict significant differences in growth. Instead, mea-
sures based on more disaggregated classifications of linguistic groups, capturing finer distinctions
between languages, are important predictors of growth and public goods provision both in terms
of statistical significance and in terms of economic magnitude.
How should we interpret these results? We have shown that the type of cultural diversity that
matters for outcomes involving conflicts of interest - civil wars, redistribution - is different from
the type of diversity that matters for outcomes that entail issues of efficiency and coordination,
such as growth. When it comes to conflict and redistribution, preferences are of the essence. The
willingness to settle disputes or to transfer resources across a cultural divide depends on how deep
the divide happens to be. Deep cleavages that go back thousands of year appear to be related with
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more conflicts of interest, compared to more superficial cleavages.
In contrast, economic growth requires that groups be able to coordinate and interact, and orga-
nize in networks of production, knowledge and trade that are affected by ethnolinguistic divisions.
In India, for instance, the degree of integration between regions is likely hindered by linguistic barri-
ers - even linguistic barriers separate relatively similar languistic groups such as Hindi and Gujarati
speakers. Coordination, integration and more generally the ability to form knowledge, production
and trading networks is hampered as soon as linguistic differentiation prevents interactions between
groups, and this can occur between groups that are relatively similar linguistically.
The case of public goods shares characteristics of both types of outcomes: public goods are
inherently redistributive in nature, and their provision depends on differences in preferences among
participants. At the same time, the provision of public goods requires coordination and interactions,
that even superficial cleavages might hamper. We found that, much as in the case of growth, for a
wide array of measures of public goods, fine distinctions between linguistic groups matter to hinder
their provision. Even when cleavages are shallow, a country may fail to have well-functioning public
services, not necessarily because people are unwilling to redistribute, but because of coordination
failures.
Future work should seek to better understand the theoretical mechanisms that account for the
contrasting findings between conflict and redistribution on the one hand, and growth and public
goods on the other hand. In particular, clarifying the differing effects of diversity on efficiency
and coordination (where fine distinctions seem to matter more) and preferences (where coarse
distinctions seem of the essence) may help account for our results.
Finally, we have focused on linguistic diversity, as a measure of a broader concept of ethno-
linguistic heterogeneity, and even more broadly as a proxy for cultural diversity. One advantage
of focusing on languages is that linguistic distinctions are quite objective: it is easier to judge
whether two populations speak different languages than to decide whether two populations belong
to different ethnicities, a more amorphous concept (precisely for this reason, ethnic categorizations
are often based on linguistic divisions, particularly for Africa). Another advantage is that data
on linguistic divisions, particularly in the form of trees, is more readily available than data on the
genealogical structure of ethnic groups within countries. There are, however, drawbacks to focusing
on languages: to the extent that linguistic divisions are imperfect measures of the source of diversity
that matters most, this should lead to downward bias on the estimates of the effect of diversity on
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political economy outcomes. In principle, the methodology we have developed for linguistic trees
should be applicable to other kinds of differences between populations. With advances in popu-
lation genetics, population phylogenies have become more widely available. Although this data is
not yet available in a single format such as the Ethnologue for languages, applying our method
to genetic data could lead to fruitful advances in the study of the political economy of cultural
diversity.
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Appendix 1 – Data on linguistic fractionalization (ELF) and polarization (POL), 
 at selected levels of aggregation 
 
country ELF (1) 
ELF 
(3) 
ELF 
(6) 
ELF 
(10) 
ELF 
(15) 
POL 
(1) 
POL 
(3) 
POL 
(6) 
POL 
(10) 
POL 
(15) 
Afghanistan 0.298 0.348 0.543 0.732 0.732 0.567 0.574 0.685 0.638 0.638 
Albania 0.000 0.257 0.257 0.257 0.257 0.000 0.453 0.453 0.453 0.453 
Algeria 0.009 0.283 0.313 0.313 0.313 0.018 0.557 0.533 0.533 0.533 
American Samoa 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.116 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.218 
Andorra 0.000 0.025 0.025 0.574 0.574 0.000 0.050 0.050 0.910 0.910 
Angola 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.726 0.785 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.723 0.588 
Anguilla 0.140 0.140 0.140 0.140 0.140 0.281 0.281 0.281 0.281 0.281 
Antigua and Barbuda 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.112 
Argentina 0.120 0.142 0.213 0.213 0.213 0.225 0.261 0.371 0.371 0.371 
Armenia 0.085 0.174 0.174 0.174 0.174 0.169 0.318 0.317 0.317 0.317 
Aruba 0.355 0.381 0.387 0.387 0.387 0.710 0.641 0.623 0.623 0.623 
Australia 0.028 0.108 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.055 0.203 0.233 0.233 0.233 
Austria 0.012 0.036 0.521 0.540 0.540 0.024 0.071 0.978 0.957 0.957 
Azerbaijan 0.346 0.367 0.373 0.373 0.373 0.634 0.594 0.588 0.588 0.588 
Bahamas 0.282 0.386 0.386 0.386 0.386 0.564 0.663 0.663 0.663 0.663 
Bahrain 0.455 0.467 0.663 0.663 0.663 0.689 0.649 0.698 0.698 0.698 
Bangladesh 0.016 0.016 0.332 0.332 0.332 0.033 0.033 0.560 0.560 0.560 
Barbados 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.182 
Belarus 0.003 0.139 0.397 0.397 0.397 0.005 0.275 0.624 0.624 0.624 
Belgium 0.038 0.518 0.663 0.675 0.734 0.076 0.973 0.817 0.797 0.708 
Belize 0.614 0.693 0.693 0.693 0.693 0.838 0.752 0.752 0.752 0.752 
Benin 0.014 0.126 0.614 0.901 0.901 0.029 0.241 0.729 0.314 0.314 
Bermuda 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Bhutan 0.418 0.418 0.720 0.846 0.846 0.837 0.837 0.742 0.492 0.492 
Bolivia 0.647 0.665 0.680 0.680 0.680 0.879 0.854 0.827 0.827 0.827 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.019 0.158 0.416 0.416 0.416 0.037 0.307 0.632 0.632 0.632 
Botswana 0.067 0.067 0.068 0.364 0.444 0.132 0.131 0.129 0.582 0.617 
Brazil 0.008 0.026 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.016 0.052 0.063 0.063 0.063 
British Ind. Ocean Terr. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
British Virgin Islands 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.334 0.334 0.334 0.334 0.334 
Brunei 0.246 0.387 0.455 0.456 0.456 0.464 0.580 0.609 0.608 0.608 
Bulgaria 0.171 0.222 0.224 0.224 0.224 0.343 0.413 0.414 0.414 0.414 
Burkina Faso 0.028 0.453 0.532 0.723 0.773 0.056 0.681 0.667 0.590 0.531 
Burundi 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.008 
Cambodia 0.088 0.143 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.170 0.265 0.286 0.286 0.286 
Cameroon 0.211 0.328 0.443 0.878 0.942 0.414 0.545 0.598 0.362 0.195 
Canada 0.071 0.489 0.541 0.549 0.549 0.136 0.820 0.791 0.771 0.771 
Cape Verde Islands 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.140 0.140 0.140 0.140 0.140 
Cayman Islands 0.499 0.547 0.547 0.547 0.547 0.999 0.956 0.956 0.956 0.956 
Central African Republic 0.353 0.424 0.557 0.958 0.960 0.584 0.628 0.669 0.159 0.151 
Chad 0.550 0.818 0.895 0.949 0.950 0.888 0.542 0.340 0.184 0.181 
Chile 0.029 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.058 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067 
China 0.066 0.491 0.491 0.491 0.491 0.127 0.623 0.622 0.622 0.622 
Colombia 0.025 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.050 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 
Comoros 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.551 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.946 
Congo 0.498 0.512 0.554 0.775 0.820 0.963 0.941 0.918 0.607 0.466 
Cook Islands 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.379 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.599 
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country ELF (1) 
ELF 
(3) 
ELF 
(6) 
ELF 
(10) 
ELF 
(15) 
POL 
(1) 
POL 
(3) 
POL 
(6) 
POL 
(10) 
POL 
(15) 
Costa Rica 0.049 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.097 0.097 0.097 0.097 0.097 
Cote dIvoire 0.004 0.382 0.820 0.862 0.917 0.008 0.647 0.503 0.399 0.277 
Croatia 0.000 0.078 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.000 0.152 0.167 0.167 0.167 
Cuba 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Cyprus 0.360 0.366 0.366 0.366 0.366 0.717 0.720 0.720 0.720 0.720 
Czech Republic 0.000 0.049 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.000 0.097 0.134 0.134 0.134 
Dem Rep Congo 0.351 0.354 0.438 0.916 0.947 0.600 0.589 0.641 0.280 0.185 
Denmark 0.014 0.034 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.029 0.066 0.099 0.099 0.099 
Djibouti 0.050 0.191 0.592 0.592 0.592 0.101 0.360 0.911 0.911 0.911 
Dominica 0.307 0.313 0.313 0.313 0.313 0.614 0.619 0.619 0.619 0.619 
Dominican Republic 0.051 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.102 0.105 0.105 0.105 0.105 
East Timor 0.524 0.524 0.575 0.897 0.897 0.848 0.848 0.721 0.366 0.366 
Ecuador 0.240 0.255 0.264 0.264 0.264 0.473 0.490 0.461 0.461 0.461 
Egypt 0.022 0.025 0.509 0.509 0.509 0.044 0.048 0.820 0.820 0.820 
El Salvador 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Equatorial Guinea 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.448 0.453 0.198 0.197 0.197 0.651 0.636 
Eritrea 0.118 0.518 0.749 0.749 0.749 0.236 0.691 0.656 0.656 0.656 
Estonia 0.455 0.463 0.476 0.476 0.476 0.903 0.896 0.870 0.870 0.870 
Ethiopia 0.020 0.579 0.830 0.843 0.843 0.040 0.919 0.494 0.465 0.465 
Falkland Islands 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Fiji 0.499 0.505 0.505 0.589 0.607 0.998 0.991 0.991 0.911 0.883 
Finland 0.119 0.140 0.140 0.140 0.140 0.238 0.268 0.268 0.268 0.268 
France 0.082 0.154 0.195 0.272 0.272 0.161 0.279 0.337 0.438 0.438 
French Guiana 0.279 0.480 0.480 0.480 0.480 0.467 0.648 0.648 0.648 0.648 
French Polynesia 0.384 0.384 0.384 0.384 0.596 0.645 0.645 0.645 0.645 0.706 
Gabon 0.115 0.115 0.125 0.819 0.919 0.231 0.231 0.247 0.529 0.281 
Gambia 0.018 0.500 0.735 0.739 0.748 0.036 0.998 0.690 0.683 0.669 
Georgia 0.435 0.574 0.576 0.576 0.576 0.715 0.667 0.662 0.662 0.662 
Germany 0.055 0.121 0.189 0.189 0.189 0.110 0.225 0.330 0.330 0.330 
Ghana 0.000 0.019 0.599 0.796 0.805 0.000 0.037 0.782 0.523 0.492 
Gibraltar 0.498 0.498 0.498 0.498 0.498 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.996 
Greece 0.024 0.142 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.047 0.259 0.310 0.310 0.310 
Greenland 0.242 0.242 0.242 0.242 0.242 0.484 0.484 0.484 0.484 0.484 
Grenada 0.016 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.032 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.126 
Guadeloupe 0.033 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.066 0.163 0.163 0.163 0.163 
Guam 0.438 0.640 0.640 0.640 0.640 0.761 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.814 
Guatemala 0.502 0.583 0.691 0.691 0.691 0.997 0.898 0.665 0.665 0.665 
Guinea 0.000 0.505 0.720 0.735 0.748 0.000 0.978 0.743 0.708 0.679 
Guinea-Bissau 0.229 0.401 0.820 0.853 0.853 0.458 0.666 0.567 0.478 0.478 
Guyana 0.077 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.150 0.151 0.149 0.149 0.149 
Haiti 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Honduras 0.045 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.088 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.109 
Hungary 0.153 0.157 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.305 0.289 0.286 0.286 0.286 
Iceland 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.038 0.038 
India 0.386 0.412 0.910 0.930 0.930 0.723 0.654 0.298 0.244 0.244 
Indonesia 0.065 0.783 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.126 0.614 0.438 0.438 0.438 
Iran 0.493 0.517 0.772 0.797 0.797 0.931 0.921 0.640 0.572 0.572 
Iraq 0.309 0.310 0.661 0.666 0.666 0.579 0.576 0.763 0.747 0.747 
Ireland 0.004 0.164 0.223 0.223 0.223 0.008 0.325 0.412 0.412 0.412 
Israel 0.387 0.434 0.664 0.665 0.665 0.731 0.627 0.635 0.634 0.634 
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country ELF (1) 
ELF 
(3) 
ELF 
(6) 
ELF 
(10) 
ELF 
(15) 
POL 
(1) 
POL 
(3) 
POL 
(6) 
POL 
(10) 
POL 
(15) 
Italy 0.002 0.019 0.559 0.593 0.593 0.004 0.037 0.766 0.667 0.667 
Jamaica 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 
Japan 0.012 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.024 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 
Jordan 0.027 0.027 0.484 0.484 0.484 0.053 0.053 0.698 0.698 0.698 
Kazakhstan 0.501 0.622 0.701 0.701 0.701 0.968 0.857 0.749 0.749 0.749 
Kenya 0.458 0.458 0.350 0.800 0.901 0.829 0.828 0.558 0.565 0.337 
Kiribati 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.065 0.065 
Korea, North 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Korea, South 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Kuwait 0.000 0.034 0.556 0.556 0.556 0.000 0.069 0.803 0.803 0.803 
Kyrgyzstan 0.461 0.633 0.670 0.670 0.670 0.887 0.828 0.771 0.771 0.771 
Laos 0.454 0.491 0.513 0.678 0.678 0.743 0.674 0.629 0.595 0.595 
Latvia 0.006 0.530 0.595 0.595 0.595 0.012 0.941 0.845 0.845 0.845 
Lebanon 0.143 0.145 0.161 0.161 0.161 0.285 0.276 0.300 0.300 0.300 
Lesotho 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.253 0.260 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.506 0.483 
Liberia 0.054 0.693 0.883 0.911 0.912 0.109 0.796 0.403 0.307 0.305 
Libya 0.015 0.075 0.362 0.362 0.362 0.030 0.146 0.653 0.653 0.653 
Liechtenstein 0.000 0.050 0.128 0.128 0.128 0.000 0.100 0.244 0.244 0.244 
Lithuania 0.003 0.331 0.339 0.339 0.339 0.006 0.576 0.559 0.559 0.559 
Luxembourg 0.013 0.429 0.452 0.498 0.498 0.027 0.840 0.789 0.762 0.762 
Macedonia 0.160 0.566 0.566 0.566 0.566 0.321 0.811 0.810 0.810 0.810 
Madagascar 0.016 0.016 0.656 0.656 0.656 0.032 0.032 0.657 0.657 0.657 
Malawi 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.519 0.519 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.667 0.667 
Malaysia 0.504 0.650 0.758 0.758 0.758 0.835 0.663 0.573 0.572 0.572 
Maldives 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.020 0.020 
Mali 0.239 0.653 0.788 0.867 0.876 0.432 0.752 0.569 0.405 0.381 
Malta 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 
Marshall Islands 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 
Martinique 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085 
Mauritania 0.170 0.171 0.172 0.172 0.172 0.323 0.319 0.317 0.317 0.317 
Mauritius 0.557 0.584 0.641 0.641 0.641 0.930 0.888 0.781 0.781 0.781 
Mayotte 0.432 0.432 0.432 0.432 0.459 0.822 0.822 0.822 0.822 0.827 
Mexico 0.126 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.234 0.244 0.243 0.243 0.243 
Micronesia 0.105 0.105 0.211 0.384 0.792 0.207 0.207 0.383 0.586 0.585 
Moldova 0.062 0.552 0.589 0.589 0.589 0.123 0.823 0.733 0.733 0.733 
Monaco 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.521 0.521 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.799 0.799 
Mongolia 0.027 0.162 0.331 0.331 0.331 0.053 0.305 0.534 0.534 0.534 
Montserrat 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 
Morocco 0.008 0.412 0.466 0.466 0.466 0.015 0.814 0.688 0.688 0.688 
Mozambique 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.730 0.929 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.671 0.255 
Myanmar 0.230 0.427 0.520 0.521 0.521 0.418 0.619 0.626 0.621 0.621 
Namibia 0.478 0.479 0.491 0.784 0.808 0.758 0.754 0.719 0.583 0.536 
Nauru 0.241 0.241 0.241 0.596 0.596 0.435 0.435 0.435 0.729 0.729 
Nepal 0.300 0.300 0.738 0.742 0.742 0.595 0.595 0.591 0.577 0.577 
Netherlands 0.118 0.123 0.389 0.389 0.389 0.219 0.227 0.567 0.567 0.567 
Netherlands Antilles 0.072 0.260 0.266 0.266 0.266 0.145 0.475 0.458 0.458 0.458 
New Caledonia 0.528 0.578 0.578 0.806 0.834 0.907 0.882 0.882 0.547 0.462 
New Zealand 0.094 0.100 0.100 0.101 0.102 0.185 0.196 0.196 0.195 0.191 
Nicaragua 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.160 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.159 
Niger 0.525 0.638 0.642 0.646 0.646 0.842 0.761 0.745 0.730 0.730 
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country ELF (1) 
ELF 
(3) 
ELF 
(6) 
ELF 
(10) 
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(15) 
POL 
(1) 
POL 
(3) 
POL 
(6) 
POL 
(10) 
POL 
(15) 
Nigeria 0.434 0.496 0.855 0.870 0.870 0.788 0.772 0.462 0.415 0.415 
Niue 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 
Norfolk Island 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Northern Mariana Islands 0.313 0.605 0.605 0.605 0.642 0.625 0.870 0.870 0.870 0.784 
Norway 0.254 0.255 0.257 0.257 0.257 0.474 0.471 0.466 0.466 0.466 
Oman 0.241 0.326 0.693 0.693 0.693 0.464 0.543 0.734 0.734 0.734 
Pakistan 0.034 0.333 0.750 0.762 0.762 0.068 0.634 0.630 0.592 0.592 
Palau 0.000 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.000 0.155 0.155 0.155 0.154 
Palestine  0.002 0.002 0.208 0.208 0.208 0.004 0.004 0.408 0.408 0.408 
Panama 0.321 0.324 0.324 0.324 0.324 0.553 0.543 0.543 0.543 0.543 
Papua New Guinea 0.564 0.699 0.941 0.989 0.990 0.748 0.662 0.203 0.042 0.038 
Paraguay 0.319 0.334 0.340 0.347 0.347 0.620 0.587 0.585 0.563 0.563 
Peru 0.347 0.366 0.376 0.376 0.376 0.644 0.585 0.552 0.552 0.552 
Philippines 0.027 0.396 0.836 0.849 0.849 0.053 0.671 0.510 0.466 0.466 
Pitcairn 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Poland 0.000 0.032 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.000 0.063 0.116 0.116 0.116 
Portugal 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.043 0.043 
Puerto Rico 0.000 0.047 0.047 0.049 0.049 0.001 0.093 0.095 0.097 0.097 
Qatar 0.538 0.607 0.608 0.608 0.608 0.960 0.872 0.869 0.869 0.869 
Reunion 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.128 0.128 0.128 0.128 0.128 
Romania 0.129 0.166 0.168 0.168 0.168 0.256 0.313 0.317 0.317 0.317 
Russia 0.172 0.214 0.283 0.283 0.283 0.316 0.363 0.448 0.448 0.448 
Rwanda 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.008 0.008 
St Helena 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
St Kitts and Nevis 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 
St Lucia 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 
St Pierre & Miquelon 0.070 0.134 0.134 0.134 0.134 0.140 0.253 0.253 0.253 0.253 
St Vincent & Grenadines 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 
Samoa 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
San Marino 0.000 0.000 0.494 0.494 0.494 0.000 0.000 0.988 0.988 0.988 
Sao Tome e Principe 0.302 0.389 0.389 0.389 0.389 0.562 0.642 0.642 0.642 0.642 
Saudi Arabia 0.167 0.172 0.609 0.609 0.609 0.309 0.313 0.860 0.860 0.860 
Senegal 0.017 0.248 0.757 0.767 0.772 0.034 0.484 0.670 0.643 0.625 
Serbia and Montenegro 0.076 0.359 0.359 0.359 0.359 0.150 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.600 
Seychelles 0.066 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.132 0.130 0.130 0.130 0.130 
Sierra Leone 0.180 0.502 0.792 0.817 0.817 0.359 0.996 0.609 0.542 0.542 
Singapore 0.491 0.747 0.748 0.748 0.748 0.708 0.629 0.628 0.628 0.628 
Slovakia 0.182 0.289 0.307 0.307 0.307 0.364 0.503 0.521 0.521 0.521 
Slovenia 0.010 0.023 0.174 0.174 0.174 0.019 0.045 0.336 0.336 0.336 
Solomon Islands 0.269 0.273 0.524 0.877 0.965 0.480 0.464 0.733 0.376 0.131 
Somalia 0.014 0.014 0.179 0.179 0.179 0.028 0.028 0.334 0.334 0.334 
South Africa 0.380 0.388 0.412 0.724 0.869 0.742 0.723 0.659 0.718 0.438 
Spain 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.438 0.438 0.064 0.066 0.067 0.696 0.696 
Sri Lanka 0.305 0.313 0.313 0.313 0.313 0.605 0.611 0.611 0.611 0.611 
Sudan 0.440 0.564 0.584 0.587 0.587 0.797 0.689 0.623 0.611 0.611 
Suriname 0.571 0.744 0.788 0.788 0.788 0.877 0.734 0.631 0.631 0.631 
Swaziland 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.228 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.099 0.428 
Sweden 0.079 0.136 0.150 0.167 0.167 0.155 0.249 0.271 0.297 0.297 
Switzerland 0.016 0.477 0.510 0.547 0.547 0.033 0.856 0.819 0.727 0.727 
Syria 0.186 0.189 0.503 0.503 0.503 0.367 0.354 0.689 0.689 0.689 
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country ELF (1) 
ELF 
(3) 
ELF 
(6) 
ELF 
(10) 
ELF 
(15) 
POL 
(1) 
POL 
(3) 
POL 
(6) 
POL 
(10) 
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Taiwan 0.033 0.488 0.488 0.488 0.488 0.065 0.757 0.757 0.757 0.757 
Tajikistan 0.346 0.445 0.467 0.482 0.482 0.685 0.706 0.706 0.709 0.709 
Tanzania 0.123 0.123 0.104 0.925 0.965 0.232 0.232 0.195 0.266 0.131 
Thailand 0.232 0.233 0.234 0.753 0.753 0.408 0.405 0.404 0.674 0.674 
Togo 0.002 0.027 0.616 0.897 0.897 0.003 0.054 0.871 0.344 0.342 
Tokelau 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 
Tonga 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.030 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.467 0.571 0.696 0.696 0.696 0.850 0.752 0.713 0.713 0.713 
Tunisia 0.005 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.021 0.023 0.023 0.023 
Turkey 0.256 0.257 0.289 0.289 0.289 0.468 0.462 0.475 0.474 0.474 
Turkmenistan 0.204 0.372 0.386 0.386 0.386 0.402 0.584 0.584 0.584 0.584 
Turks and Caicos Islands 0.145 0.145 0.145 0.145 0.145 0.291 0.291 0.291 0.291 0.291 
Tuvalu 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.139 0.139 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.279 0.279 
U.S. Virgin Islands 0.316 0.339 0.339 0.339 0.339 0.632 0.587 0.587 0.587 0.587 
Uganda 0.445 0.479 0.312 0.688 0.928 0.865 0.793 0.508 0.608 0.255 
Ukraine 0.027 0.126 0.492 0.492 0.492 0.053 0.236 0.777 0.777 0.777 
United Arab Emirates 0.611 0.662 0.775 0.777 0.777 0.810 0.738 0.579 0.573 0.573 
United Kingdom 0.031 0.135 0.139 0.139 0.139 0.060 0.250 0.251 0.251 0.251 
Uruguay 0.000 0.027 0.075 0.092 0.092 0.000 0.054 0.146 0.176 0.176 
USA 0.058 0.273 0.351 0.353 0.353 0.111 0.479 0.552 0.543 0.543 
Uzbekistan 0.246 0.419 0.428 0.428 0.428 0.479 0.624 0.601 0.600 0.600 
Vanuatu 0.213 0.215 0.215 0.838 0.972 0.388 0.382 0.382 0.459 0.108 
Vatican State 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Venezuela 0.024 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.048 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 
Viet Nam 0.154 0.204 0.234 0.234 0.234 0.288 0.362 0.393 0.389 0.389 
Wallis and Futuna 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.407 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.793 
Yemen 0.029 0.126 0.579 0.579 0.579 0.058 0.239 0.914 0.914 0.914 
Zambia 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.834 0.855 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.497 0.439 
Zimbabwe 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.300 0.526 0.098 0.098 0.098 0.507 0.660 
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Table 1 – Growth, Conflict, Redistribution and Linguistic Diversity in Chad and Zambia 
 
 Chad Zambia 
Per capita growth 1960-1990 
(Easterly-Levine), % 
-1% -1% 
Per capita growth 1965-2000* 
(PWT 6.2), % 
-1% -1% 
Years of civil war 1965-1999*  
  
35 0 
Redistribution as % of GDP, 1985-
1995  
0.9% 3.8% 
ELF (most disaggregated level) 
  
0.95 0.85 
ELF (at the aggregated level of 
language families)   
0.55 0.01 
Polarization (most disaggregated 
level)  
0.18 0.43 
Polarization (at the aggregated 
level of language families) 
0.89 0.02 
* We choose 1965 as the start date for the data on growth and conflict as this is the date of 
independence for Zambia.  
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Table 3: Civil Conflict and Linguistic Fractionalization (1945-1999) 
Dependent variable: Onset of Civil War, logit estimator 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ELF(1) ELF(3) ELF(6) ELF(10) ELF(15) 
ELF (at different levels 1.060 0.777 0.085 -0.138 -0.051
of aggregation) [2.02]** [1.57] [0.22] [0.37] [0.14]
Lagged civil war -0.908 -0.906 -0.861 -0.852 -0.855
[3.45]*** [3.58]*** [3.37]*** [3.33]*** [3.33]***
Log lagged GDP/cap -0.700 -0.651 -0.693 -0.717 -0.706
[5.45]*** [4.87]*** [5.05]*** [5.12]*** [5.10]***
Log lagged population 0.292 0.270 0.282 0.288 0.286
[4.80]*** [4.51]*** [4.65]*** [4.92]*** [4.90]***
% mountainous 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
[1.69]* [1.60] [1.75]* [1.81]* [1.81]*
Noncontiguous state dummy 0.555 0.474 0.464 0.467 0.465
[1.90]* [1.67]* [1.64] [1.66]* [1.65]*
Oil exporter dummy 0.775 0.758 0.865 0.903 0.888
[2.81]*** [2.81]*** [3.32]*** [3.42]*** [3.37]***
New State dummy (1st or 2nd  1.751 1.741 1.756 1.762 1.760
year from independence) [5.07]*** [5.04]*** [5.08]*** [5.12]*** [5.11]***
Instability dummy  0.649 0.675 0.649 0.644 0.646
(3 years prior) [3.08]*** [3.16]*** [3.05]*** [3.03]*** [3.04]***
Democracy lagged (Polity 2) 0.015 0.017 0.019 0.019 0.019
[0.81] [0.96] [1.01] [1.05] [1.04]
Religious fractionalization -0.122 -0.061 0.037 0.093 0.065
[0.22] [0.11] [0.07] [0.17] [0.12]
Constant -2.307 -2.493 -2.175 -1.986 -2.070
[1.94]* [2.03]** [1.77]* [1.55] [1.62]
(t-statistics based on robust standard errors, clustered at the level of countries, in parentheses) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All columns involve 6,059 observations from 149 countries from 1945 to 1999. 
The table reports logit coefficients, not marginal effects. 
The specification is based on Fearon and Laitin (2003), Table 1, column 1, page 84. Results are robust to 
controlling for the growth of GDP per capita, the growth of GDP per capita lagged, a lagged dichotomous 
indicator of democracy (instead of the Polity2 index), a Subsaharan Africa dummy, an Asian dummy, a 
North Africa / Middle East dummy, and an anocracy dummy. 
The data is from Fearon and Laitin (2003), except for ELF (authors’ calculations from Ethnologue 
database).  
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Table 4: Civil Conflict and Linguistic Polarization (1945-1999) 
Dependent variable: Onset of Civil War, logit estimator 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
POL(1) POL(3) POL(6) POL(10) POL(15) 
POL (at different levels 0.623 0.350 -0.317 -0.600 -0.632
of aggregation) [2.06]** [0.95] [0.79] [1.41] [1.39]
Lagged civil war -0.912 -0.872 -0.873 -0.869 -0.874
[3.45]*** [3.40]*** [3.31]*** [3.38]*** [3.39]***
Log lagged GDP per capita -0.702 -0.681 -0.702 -0.701 -0.699
[5.46]*** [5.24]*** [5.37]*** [5.37]*** [5.35]***
Log lagged populations 0.290 0.275 0.293 0.295 0.296
[4.76]*** [4.65]*** [4.85]*** [4.85]*** [4.80]***
% Mountainous 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009
[1.65]* [1.53] [1.83]* [1.95]* [1.99]**
Noncontiguous state 0.568 0.503 0.422 0.417 0.422
[1.93]* [1.75]* [1.48] [1.46] [1.50]
Oil exporter dummy 0.765 0.828 0.904 0.940 0.940
[2.75]*** [3.17]*** [3.52]*** [3.60]*** [3.63]***
New State dummy 1.749 1.747 1.779 1.808 1.807
[5.06]*** [5.08]*** [5.12]*** [5.16]*** [5.12]***
Instability dummy 0.651 0.657 0.649 0.654 0.655
[3.09]*** [3.09]*** [3.06]*** [3.09]*** [3.09]***
Democracy lagged (Polity 2) 0.015 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.018
[0.81] [0.99] [1.04] [1.00] [1.00]
Religious fractionalization -0.131 -0.024 0.048 0.022 -0.038
[0.24] [0.04] [0.09] [0.04] [0.07]
Constant -2.282 -2.282 -2.039 -1.946 -1.953
[1.92]* [1.91]* [1.71]* [1.63] [1.64]
(t-statistics based on robust standard errors, clustered at the level of countries, in parentheses) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All columns involve 6,059 observations from 149 countries from 1945 to 1999. 
The table reports logit coefficients, not marginal effects. 
The specification is based on Fearon and Laitin (2003), Table 1, column 1, page 84. Results are robust to 
controlling for the growth of GDP per capita, the growth of GDP per capita lagged, a lagged 
dichotomous indicator of democracy (instead of the Polity2 index), a Subsaharan Africa dummy, an 
Asian dummy, a North Africa / Middle East dummy, and an anocracy dummy. 
The data is from Fearon and Laitin (2003), except for POL (authors’ calculations from Ethnologue 
database).  
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Table 5: Redistribution and Linguistic Fractionalization (1985-1995) 
Dependent variable: Transfers and Subsidies as Share of GDP, least squares estimator 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ELF(1) ELF(3) ELF(6) ELF(10) ELF(15) 
ELF (at different levels -4.013 -3.797 -1.314 -1.731 -1.614
of aggregation) [2.26]** [2.48]** [1.00] [1.23] [1.15]
Log GDP per capita 1985-95 1.036 0.980 0.944 0.953 0.969
[2.03]** [1.98]* [1.81]* [1.84]* [1.86]*
Log population 1985-95 0.033 0.036 0.096 0.103 0.108
[0.12] [0.14] [0.36] [0.38] [0.40]
Population above 65 0.684 0.717 0.704 0.703 0.699
[4.17]*** [4.27]*** [4.16]*** [4.13]*** [4.10]***
UK legal origin 5.169 5.187 4.643 4.804 4.810
[2.45]** [2.56]** [2.17]** [2.20]** [2.19]**
French legal origin 4.497 4.657 4.371 4.378 4.388
[1.86]* [1.99]* [1.76]* [1.75]* [1.75]*
Socialist legal origin 9.224 9.191 8.615 8.634 8.66
[2.97]*** [3.04]*** [2.77]*** [2.77]*** [2.78]***
Scandinavian legal origin 7.908 7.490 7.349 7.317 7.343
[1.91]* [1.84]* [1.77]* [1.76]* [1.76]*
% Catholic 1980 0.034 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.036
[1.62] [1.68]* [1.69]* [1.73]* [1.72]*
% Muslim 1980 -0.024 -0.019 -0.024 -0.023 -0.024
[1.03] [0.81] [1.02] [1.00] [1.03]
% Protestant 1980 -0.024 -0.023 -0.026 -0.024 -0.025
[0.59] [0.54] [0.60] [0.57] [0.58]
Small island dummy -6.456 -6.442 -5.980 -6.075 -6.056
[3.62]*** [3.57]*** [3.50]*** [3.55]*** [3.54]***
Latitude 8.423 8.750 9.245 8.847 8.924
[1.84]* [1.97]* [2.02]** [2.01]** [2.02]**
Latin America and Caribbean -4.464 -4.618 -4.861 -5.077 -5.050
[2.78]*** [2.90]*** [3.05]*** [3.22]*** [3.21]***
Sub Saharan Africa -1.464 -1.446 -1.480 -1.171 -1.103
[0.98] [0.96] [0.99] [0.74] [0.69]
East Asia & Pacific -3.218 -2.799 -3.254 -3.286 -3.299
[1.68]* [1.51] [1.72]* [1.77]* [1.78]*
Constant -10.058 -9.938 -10.550 -10.491 -10.712
[1.44] [1.46] [1.52] [1.49] [1.52]
R-squared 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.84
(t-statistics based on robust standard errors, in parentheses) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All columns involve 101 country observations. 
The specification is based on Desmet, Ortuño-Ortin and Weber (2009), Table 2, column 8, i.e. the 
specification with the most controls (considering instead the other seven specifications in Desmet, 
Ortuño-Ortin and Weber, 2009, with fewer regressors did not change the pattern of coefficients on ELF, 
although the degree of statistical significance remains high at higher levels of aggregation). 
The data is from Desmet, Ortuño-Ortin and Weber (2009), except for ELF (authors’ calculations from 
Ethnologue database).  
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Table 6: Redistribution and Linguistic Polarization (1985-1995) 
Dependent variable: Transfers and Subsidies as Share of GDP, least squares estimator 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
POL(1) POL(3) POL(6) POL(10) POL(15) 
POL (at different levels -2.232 -3.066 -0.994 -1.726 -1.459
of aggregation) [2.09]** [2.63]** [0.69] [0.98] [0.82]
Log GDP per capita 1985-95 1.026 0.994 0.983 1.027 0.989
[2.00]** [2.02]** [1.82]* [1.89]* [1.84]*
Log population 1985-95 0.060 0.048 0.074 0.052 0.052
[0.22] [0.18] [0.27] [0.19] [0.19]
Population above 65 0.685 0.689 0.700 0.685 0.691
[4.13]*** [4.10]*** [4.10]*** [3.91]*** [3.96]***
UK legal origin 5.120 5.175 4.490 4.646 4.618
[2.41]** [2.61]** [2.13]** [2.07]** [2.09]**
French legal origin 4.550 4.669 4.266 4.309 4.284
[1.87]* [2.05]** [1.72]* [1.67]* [1.69]*
Socialist legal origin 9.218 9.065 8.533 8.487 8.447
[2.95]*** [3.09]*** [2.78]*** [2.71]*** [2.73]***
Scandinavian legal origin 7.813 6.864 7.082 6.883 7.004
[1.90]* [1.71]* [1.73]* [1.69]* [1.72]*
% Catholic 1980 0.033 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.034
[1.57] [1.66] [1.69]* [1.66] [1.67]*
% Muslim 1980 -0.025 -0.023 -0.026 -0.027 -0.027
[1.09] [0.98] [1.13] [1.18] [1.18]
% Protestant 1980 -0.024 -0.019 -0.026 -0.026 -0.027
[0.59] [0.48] [0.62] [0.65] [0.66]
Small island dummy -6.316 -6.538 -6.054 -6.303 -6.224
[3.52]*** [3.54]*** [3.42]*** [3.45]*** [3.40]***
Latitude 8.547 9.466 9.599 9.839 9.967
[1.87]* [2.13]** [2.11]** [2.17]** [2.16]**
Latin America and  -4.463 -4.82 -4.776 -4.936 -4.856
Caribbean [2.80]*** [3.07]*** [3.00]*** [3.18]*** [3.13]***
Sub Saharan Africa -1.464 -1.707 -1.445 -1.474 -1.532
[0.99] [1.17] [0.98] [1.01] [1.05]
East Asia & Pacific -3.292 -3.279 -3.438 -3.607 -3.524
[1.71]* [1.84]* [1.83]* [1.97]* [1.93]*
Constant -10.400 -9.777 -10.455 -10.030 -9.938
[1.48] [1.45] [1.52] [1.45] [1.42]
R-squared 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.84
(t-statistics based on robust standard errors, in parentheses) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All columns involve 101 country observations. 
The specification is based on Desmet, Ortuño-Ortin and Weber (2009), Table 2, column 8, i.e. the 
specification with the most controls (considering instead the other seven specifications in Desmet, 
Ortuño-Ortin and Weber, 2009, with fewer regressors did not change the pattern of coefficients on POL, 
although the degree of statistical significance remains high at higher levels of aggregation). 
The data is from Desmet, Ortuño-Ortin and Weber (2009), except for POL (authors’ calculations from 
Ethnologue database).  
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Table 9 – Growth and Linguistic Fractionalization 
(Easterly and Levine specification, random effects estimator, 1960-1989 panel) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ELF(1) ELF(3) ELF(6) ELF(10) ELF(15) 
ELF (at different levels  -0.575 -0.560 -0.851 -1.367 -1.423
of aggregation) [0.58] [0.68] [1.25] [1.97]** [2.10]**
Log of initial income 4.925 4.860 4.926 4.575 4.564
[1.85]* [1.84]* [1.87]* [1.78]* [1.78]*
Log of initial income squared -0.348 -0.342 -0.345 -0.328 -0.327
[1.99]** [1.98]** [2.01]** [1.95]* [1.95]*
Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa -1.584 -1.591 -1.658 -1.424 -1.334
[2.81]*** [2.83]*** [3.03]*** [2.48]** [2.28]**
Dummy for Latin America  -2.045 -2.092 -2.226 -2.382 -2.396
and Caribbean [4.97]*** [4.96]*** [4.98]*** [5.24]*** [5.30]***
Log of schooling 1.177 1.147 1.025 1.050 1.066
[2.34]** [2.28]** [2.03]** [2.15]** [2.19]**
Dummy for the 1960s 2.282 2.280 2.249 2.215 2.218
[8.54]*** [8.57]*** [8.45]*** [8.37]*** [8.34]***
Dummy for the 1970s 1.969 1.967 1.947 1.936 1.938
[7.22]*** [7.23]*** [7.24]*** [7.22]*** [7.21]***
Constant -16.895 -16.614 -16.542 -14.649 -14.581
[1.64] [1.63] [1.63] [1.48] [1.48]
R-squared overall 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.38
(t-statistics based on robust standard errors in brackets) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Random effects estimates from an unbalanced panel of up to 94 countries, 259 observations over 3 
decades (1960s, 1970s, 1980s). 
The specification is that of column 1 of Table 4 in Easterly and Levine (1997), pp. 1225-1226 (also 
column 1 of Table 8 in Alesina et al. (2003), p. 168), which allows for the largest number of 
observations. 
The pattern of significance and magnitude of the coefficients on ELF at various levels of aggregation are 
robust (and in some cases strengthened) when including additional controls included in Easterly and 
Levine (1997), namely 1) controlling for political assassinations 2) controlling for political 
assassinations plus financial depth, the black market premium, and the fiscal surplus to GDP ratio. 3) 
controlling for all of the above plus the number of coups d'etat, the number of revolutions, a dummy for 
civil wars and a measure of political rights (Gastil’s index of democracy). 
The data is from Easterly and Levine (1997), except for ELF (authors’ calculations from Ethnologue 
database). 
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Table 10 – Growth and Linguistic Polarization 
(Easterly and Levine specification, random effects estimator, 1960-1989 panel) 
 
(1) (3) (6) (10) (15) 
POL(1) POL(3) POL(6) POL(10) POL(15) 
POL (at different levels  -0.367 -0.699 -0.682 -0.467 -0.028
of aggregation) [0.65] [1.23] [1.04] [0.66] [0.04]
Log of initial income 4.919 4.830 4.845 4.915 4.883
[1.85]* [1.84]* [1.83]* [1.85]* [1.83]*
Log of initial income squared -0.347 -0.340 -0.339 -0.346 -0.344
[1.99]** [1.99]** [1.97]** [2.00]** [1.97]**
Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa -1.579 -1.559 -1.593 -1.570 -1.595
[2.80]*** [2.76]*** [2.83]*** [2.78]*** [2.85]***
Dummy for Latin America  -2.044 -2.127 -2.170 -2.137 -2.052
and Caribbean [4.97]*** [5.07]*** [4.90]*** [4.79]*** [4.57]***
Log of schooling 1.183 1.157 1.108 1.183 1.181
[2.35]** [2.31]** [2.22]** [2.32]** [2.34]**
Dummy for the 1960s 2.281 2.284 2.286 2.293 2.288
[8.53]*** [8.54]*** [8.50]*** [8.45]*** [8.45]***
Dummy for the 1970s 1.969 1.969 1.965 1.973 1.971
[7.22]*** [7.23]*** [7.22]*** [7.18]*** [7.20]***
Constant -16.853 -16.394 -16.482 -16.831 -16.866
[1.64] [1.62] [1.62] [1.64] [1.64]
R-squared overall 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.36
(t-statistics based on robust standard errors in brackets) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Random effects estimates from an unbalanced panel of up to 94 countries, 259 observations over 3 
decades (1960s, 1970s, 1980s). 
The specification is that of column 1 of Table 4 in Easterly and Levine (1997), pp. 1225-1226 (also 
column 1 of Table 8 in Alesina et al. (2003), p. 168), which allows for the largest number of 
observations. 
The pattern of significance and magnitude of the coefficients on ELF at various levels of aggregation are 
similar when including additional controls included in Easterly and Levine (1997), namely 1) controlling 
for political assassinations 2) controlling for political assassinations plus financial depth, the black 
market premium, and the fiscal surplus to GDP ratio. 3) controlling for all of the above plus the number 
of coups d'etat, the number of revolutions, a dummy for civil wars and a measure of political rights 
(Gastil’s index of democracy). 
The data is from Easterly and Levine (1997), except for POL (authors’ calculations from Ethnologue 
database). 
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Table 11 – Growth and Linguistic Fractionalization 
(Augmented Solow specification, random effects estimator, 1960-2004 panel) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ELF(1) ELF(3) ELF(6) ELF(10) ELF(15) 
ELF (at various levels  -1.074 -1.280 -1.354 -1.849 -1.640
of aggregation) [1.11] [1.64] [2.13]** [2.98]*** [2.65]***
Log initial real per capita GDP -1.848 -1.855 -1.821 -1.845 -1.832
[7.52]*** [7.60]*** [7.69]*** [7.83]*** [7.74]***
Investment share of GDP 0.095 0.093 0.089 0.088 0.088
[4.51]*** [4.46]*** [4.18]*** [4.30]*** [4.25]***
Avg. schooling years in the total  0.260 0.259 0.232 0.222 0.229
population aged 25+ [3.13]*** [3.15]*** [2.89]*** [2.76]*** [2.82]***
Growth of population -0.507 -0.505 -0.488 -0.474 -0.478
[2.92]*** [2.90]*** [2.73]*** [2.69]*** [2.71]***
Log population 0.290 0.316 0.322 0.338 0.341
[1.66]* [1.81]* [1.86]* [1.97]** [1.97]**
Interaction between openness  -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
and log population [2.29]** [2.25]** [2.26]** [2.13]** [2.15]**
Openness (imports + exports  0.057 0.057 0.056 0.054 0.055
over GDP) [2.69]*** [2.70]*** [2.72]*** [2.63]*** [2.64]***
Latin America and  -0.739 -0.833 -1.062 -1.208 -1.151
Carribean dummy [1.86]* [2.08]** [2.49]** [2.85]*** [2.71]***
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy -2.193 -2.189 -2.322 -1.950 -1.869
[3.69]*** [3.71]*** [3.90]*** [3.40]*** [3.21]***
Constant 13.895 13.863 13.933 14.237 13.992
[5.40]*** [5.50]*** [5.62]*** [5.76]*** [5.64]***
R-squared 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.40
Absolute value of t statistics, based on robust standard errors, in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Random effects estimates based on an unbalanced panel of 101 countries over 5 periods (1960-69, 1970-
79, 1980-89, 1990-99, 2000-2004), 428 observations. 
The specification includes period dummies for 1970-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999 and 2000-2004 
(estimates not reported). 
Investment, schooling, population growth, and openness are entered as period averages; log initial per 
capita income and log population are for the first year of each period. 
The data on income per capita, income growth, population, population growth, openness and investment 
are from the Penn World Tables, version 6.2 (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2006). The data on human 
capital is from Barro-Lee (2000). The geographic controls are from the CIA World Factbook (2009). The 
ELF data is from the authors’ calculations using the Ethnologue database. 
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Table 12 – Growth and Linguistic Polarization 
(Augmented Solow specification, random effects estimator, 1960-2004 panel) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
POL(1) POL(3) POL(6) POL(10) POL(15) 
POL (at various levels  -0.659 -0.980 -0.874 -0.207 -0.034
of aggregation) [1.17] [1.87]* [1.57] [0.34] [0.05]
Log initial real per capita GDP -1.851 -1.851 -1.814 -1.833 -1.833
[7.51]*** [7.57]*** [7.57]*** [7.59]*** [7.57]***
Investment share of GDP 0.095 0.092 0.092 0.095 0.095
[4.51]*** [4.40]*** [4.33]*** [4.44]*** [4.46]***
Avg. schooling years in the total  0.261 0.268 0.263 0.268 0.267
population aged 25+ [3.15]*** [3.23]*** [3.18]*** [3.21]*** [3.20]***
Growth of population -0.506 -0.499 -0.493 -0.513 -0.518
[2.92]*** [2.88]*** [2.79]*** [2.91]*** [2.94]***
Log population 0.289 0.303 0.281 0.286 0.285
[1.65]* [1.74]* [1.60] [1.62] [1.62]
Interaction between openness  -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006
and log population [2.29]** [2.24]** [2.16]** [2.24]** [2.26]**
Openness (imports + exports  0.057 0.056 0.054 0.055 0.055
over GDP) [2.68]*** [2.66]*** [2.56]** [2.60]*** [2.61]***
Latin America and  -0.741 -0.861 -0.933 -0.783 -0.748
Carribean dummy [1.87]* [2.17]** [2.24]** [1.84]* [1.76]*
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy -2.190 -2.173 -2.217 -2.180 -2.181
[3.69]*** [3.71]*** [3.77]*** [3.69]*** [3.68]***
Constant 13.953 14.026 13.986 13.772 13.701
[5.41]*** [5.52]*** [5.55]*** [5.42]*** [5.40]***
R-squared 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.38
Absolute value of t statistics, based on robust standard errors, in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Random effects estimates based on an unbalanced panel of 101 countries over 5 periods (1960-69, 1970-
79, 1980-89, 1990-99, 2000-2004), 428 observations. 
The specification includes period dummies for 1970-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999 and 2000-2004 
(estimates not reported). 
Investment, schooling, population growth, and openness are entered as period averages; log initial per 
capita income and log population are for the first year of each period. 
The data on income per capita, income growth, population, population growth, openness and investment 
are from the Penn World Tables, version 6.2  (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2006). The data on human 
capital is from Barro-Lee (2000). The geographic controls are from the CIA World Factbook (2009). The 
POL data is from the authors’ calculations using the Ethnologue database. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Phylogenetic Tree of Major Languages in Pakistan 
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Figure 2 - Hypothetical Language Tree. 
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Figure 3 - Language Tree from Ethnologue. 
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